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Roger F. Cutler
Attorney for Defendant
602 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KEITH E. SOHM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 14654

TNENDELL D. WINEGAR, dba UTAH
ELECTRIC & HOTOR COHPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the appellant, Keith Sohm, to
collect contingent legal fees.

The respondent-Winegar

asserted that he only agreed to pay a reasonable fee for
services rendered and counterclaimed to recover excessive
fees which were retained by attorney Sohm.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court, sitting without a jury, found that
there was no contingent fee agreement; rather, the
appellant-Sohm had been retained on an implied agreement,
whereunder the respondent-Winegar would pay a reasonable
fee.

The Court found that the appellant-Sohm had in fact
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been paid more than a reasonable fee and dismissed his
complaint.

The Lower Court, further, dismissed Mr.

Winegar's counterclaim and ordered each party to bear its
own costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-respondent, Wendell D. Winegar,
seeks this Court to affirm the Lower Court's decision
and to award him costs.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff-appellant has failed to state the
facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. The facts when so viewed show the following:
1.

The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant-

Sohm"), is a licensed member of the Utah Bar and commenced
doing legal work for the defendant-respondent,
"respondent-Winegar"), in the 1960's.

(hereinafter

At that L.me he

did work on the basis of a $25.00 per month retainer.
(R-66).

Subsequently, the appellant-Sohm changed the fee

arrangement and began doing work on a basis of $25.00 per
hour.

(R-67).

hour.

(R-67; see Exhibit P-6).

2.

This sum was later increased to $35.00 per

In mid 1972, the appellant-Sohm was working on an

hourly basis.

At approximately that time, he accepted a

case involving Mr. Winegar known as the "All Grain" Matter.
Hhen he undertook the case, appellant-Sohm did not discuss
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his fee with Mr. Winegar, but assumed that he would
be paid a reasonable fee.

He testified:

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)

"A.

(~1r.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
You just contemplated a
reasonable fee of Mr. Winegar

"A ..

(Mr.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)

.. A.

(Mr . Sohm)

"Q.

(!1r. Cutler)
~1r. Winegar would have had the
resources to pay any fee you charged him as
long as it was reasonable?

"A.

(Mr.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
The outcome of this litigation
didn't depend on whether you would or would
not be paid?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)
It didn't matter.
I think he
would have paid me ... "
(T-69-70)

Sohm)

You didn't discuss your fee?
No I

Sohm)

didn't.

Very much so.
You knew he had to pay the fee?
Yes.

Sohm)

Yes.

After the suit was commenced, appellant-Sohrn wrote to
Mr. Winegar and indicated he may be willing to take it on
a contingent fee basis, if he received a $600.00 cash
retainer.
"Q.

(T-70).

Concerning this offer, Mr. Sohm testified:

(Mr. Cutler)
Well, Mr. Sohm, as of August
21, 1972, by your own letter, you said you
wanted a $600. retainer fee to be applied
against the contingent arrangement, or you
wanted to be paid on an hourly basis, isn't
that correct?

"A.

(Mr.

Sohm) Right.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)

Had you performed some work on
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this matter, assuming, as I understand your
testimony, that at any rate you would be paid
some reasonable fee?
"A.

(Mr.

Sohm)

This is right."

(T-71).

The defendant-respondent never accepted the offer of a
contingent fee and never tendered the $600.00 retainer fee
requested by Mr. Sohm.

(R-76).

Rather, appellant-Sohm's

first billing demanded payment based on the hours worked to
that date.

(See Statement of August 21, 1972 marked as

Exhibit 3-P, R-72).

In this statement, Mr. Winegar was

billed for 18 hours of legal work at $25.00 per hour.
(R-73).
3,

That billing was paid by Mr.
On December

~-<inegar.

(R-74).

21, 1972, Attorney Sohm obtained

a summary judgment against All Grain Company, but a
personal claim against a Mr. Lawrence C. Taylor was
continued for trial.

(See Exhibit 2-P).

However,

negotiations concerning payment of the account were
apparently underway subsequent to the entry of the
summary judgment, but prior to the trial of Mr. Taylor.
On February 16, 1973, Attorney Sohm informed Mr. Winegar
that there was a prospect of obtaining payment on account
in installments of $1,000.

Now that some payment appeared

probable on the account, Attorney Sohm attempted to convert
the heretofore hourly arrangement to a contingent one by
unalaterally informing respondent-Winegar that he was going
to figure his fees on a contingent basis.
4,

(Exhibit 8-D).

The first payment on the All Grain case was made

on February 24, 1973 and irregular payments were made through
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August, 1973.

Thereafter appellant-Sohm did little or

nothing to collect the balance owed on the account.

Mr.

Winegar testified:
"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
Did you have to undertake future
collections after this (February, 1973) payment?

"A.

(Mr.
days
so I
been

Winegar)
Yes.
I waited for a number of
or 2 or 3 weeks and I had heard nothing
called Mr. Sohm to see if any money had
received, and he said, 'no.'

And I says, have you done anything? And he
says, 'I have been awful busy,' and he came
back and says, 'I can't find your file.'
And I said that time is very important to me
and ask him what he was going to do to get
this money.
And he said,

'let me check it out.'

And I didn't wait but got on the phone and
started calling these people, and I found out
they had no contact and I had to make thirty or
forty phone calls on my time and efforts because I
couldn't get Mr. Sohm to do it for me.
(See
Exhibit 15-D, showing records of long distance
telephone calls and dates evidencing about thirty
phone contacts).

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
Did you contact Mr. Sohm during this
period to see if Mr. Sohm would pick up your
laboring oar?

"A.

(Mr. Winegar)
Yes.
I was continually provoked
because I couldn't get him to do anything. And
he said, 'I will check into it,' and he would
call All Grain.'
And I said, 'I ain't going to
wait.
It seems to me you ought to be the attorney,
Mr. Sohm, ... "
(R-101, 102 and 103).

The respondent-Winegar's records show that payment of $1,000.
was received October 1, 1973 and $1,958. as full payment on
a compromised settlement was received by Mr. Winegar on
October 3, 1973.

(See Exhibit 13-D; cf. Mr. Sohm's testimony
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reported at Page 3 of appellant's brief).
5.

The plaintiff-appellant was unable to state the

total work he had performed for Mr. Winegar at trial on the
All Grain matter; however, he did prepare a complaint,
make two (2) Court appearances on Motions and negotiate
preliminary arrangements with opposing counsel concerning
payment of the debt.

(R-79).

6. Appellant-Sohm thereafter billed

~tr.

Winegar in

a variety of ways, at times requesting a fourth and
at other times requesting a third of the sums collected,
including sums collected by Mr. Winegar's own efforts.
(R-79, 80; cf. Exhibit 10-D).
7.

For services rendered Mr. Winegar, the appellant-

Sohm admitted he received a total of $2,000., excluding
payments made on the Flint-Walling matter.

(R-59).

Respondent-Winegar's records indicate Mr. Sohm received
$2,500.
8.

(Exhibit 13-D; R-106).
In approximately 1962, appellant-Winegar requested

that attorney Sohm file litigation concerning a Mr. Kurt
P. Rothe.

After filing the action, the case was dismissed

because of the Deadman's Statute.

Appellant-Sohm claims

that the matter was taken as a contingency.
Cause of Action, R-3).

(See Second

However, he inconsistently testi-

fied that he billed Mr. Winegar and was paid his billings.
(R-3; cf. R-81).

Concerning the Rothe case, Mr. Sohm

testified:
"No I billed him something, I thought I ought to
have something for it."
(R-82, 83).
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9. On or about January 24, 1975,

(approximately 13

years later), the executor of the Kurt P. Rothe estate
determined that approximately $1,780. was available to
pay Mr. Winegar on a claim that he had filed against the
estate.

The executor was unable to locate Mr. Winegar

from his location in Heber City, but noted that Attorney
Sohm had previously represented him.

Therefore, contact

was made with Mr. Sohm in attempt to locate Mr. Winegar.
(R-83).
10. Mr. Sohm estimated he spent two or three hours

in calls to Mr. Winegar and in obtaining the money from
the executor of the estate.

(R-85).

However, no court

appearance was required and no legal papers were drafted
by Mr. Sohm.

(R-87).

Rather, the extent of Mr. Sohm's

efforts involved telephone calls with an attorney representing the estate, contacting Mr. Winegar to inform him of
the event and confirming his approval of the settlement
with the executor.
11.

(R-88).

Thereafter, the executor forwarded a check

made payable to t1r. Winegar; however, Mr. Sohrn typed
his own name on the check and demanded that he be given
a 25% contingency before he would endorse it over to
Mr. Winegar.

(R-104).

Respondent-Winegar refused to

pay what he considered extortion and directly contacted
the executor.

(R-105).

The executor cancelled his first

check and issued another made payable to Mr. Winegar and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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11.

The appellant-Sohm demands a one-fourth con-

tingent fee and has billed the defendant the sum of
$445.14.

Respondent-Winegar never agreed to pay and

never understood that appellant-Sohm expected one-fourth
of the estate check, until after Mr. Sohm placed his own
name on the check as a payee.
12.

(R-105).

Appellant-Sohm asserts that $50. for two hours

work is due on a case known as the "Flint-Walling"
matter which was billed on an hourly rate.

(R-3, 65, 66).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT-SOHM FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO PROVE THAT THE
PARTIES CONTRACTED AND AGREED THAT MR. SOHM WOULD RECEIVE
A CONTINGENT PERCENTAGE FEE OF ANY RECOVERY MADE ON BEHALF
OF RESPONDENT-WINEGAR.
As is clear from the pleadings of appellant-Sohm, he
has alleged that he had an agreement with respondentWinegar to receive a 25% contingent fee of all recoveries
made on two collection matters.

The first known as the

"All Grain" suit, involved a collection on an account
receivable for merchandise and services delivered.

The

second known as the "Rothe Estate" involved another
account payable situation.
Interestingly, appellant-Sohm not only failed to prove
the existence of such a contingency fee agreement, but

(at

least with regard to the All Grain suit) admitted that he
had abandoned that claim and sought to recover on the basis
of a reasonable charge for services rendered.

His testi-

mony clearly stated that he took the All Grain matter on an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hourly basis; however, after collection became probable,
he attempted to convince Mr. Winegar to substitute the
hourly fee arrangement for a one-third contingency, with
a $600. base retainer.

That arrangement was never

consummated by Mr. Sohm's own admission.

He testified:

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
After you tell him, (Mr. Winegar
in a note on the bottom of a bill):
'I will
pursue the matter on a contingent basis with a
minimum as suggested in one of my previous letters,'
did he (Mr. Winegar) agree to pay this?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)
(R-76).

No, he did not agree to pay this."

In fact, Mr. Sohm testified that he understood he would
be working on an hourly rate as a basis of determining a
reasonable fee and not a contingent one.
Statement of Fact No. 2).

(See quote in

Thereafter, during pointed cross-

examination he seemed to abandon his contingency fee claim
and switch his legal theory to an argument that 25% of a
collection was a reasonable fee.

He stated:

"My contention, of course, is that as far as
the fee: one-fourth is a reasonable fee."
(R-75).
Therefore, although

~rr.

Sohm's complaint alleged a contin-

gent fee agreement, his own testimony proved that the
All Grain matter was taken on the basis of a reasonable fee.
This fee was in turn based on the hours worked and payable
at the rate of 525. per hour.
Subseque:1tly, a:tJpellant-Schm did retain funds from
pa7~e~ts

t::e

~ecei~,e~

ar.c~..:::t

~hrough

csllec~eC.,

ar.C

~is
'Jr..

o~~ice,

equal to 25% of

se?eral. sccasior.s billed
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appellant-Sohm cleverly has quoted a portion of Mr.
Winegar's testimony, which standing out of context
would lead the Court to believe that Mr. ~vinegar did
not object to this billing.

However, Mr. Winegar's

full response is as follows:
"Q.

(Mr. Sohrn)
And you never did object to the fee
I had put on those bills of one-fourth did you?

"A.

(Mr. Winegar)
question.

"Q.

(Mr. Sohm)

"A.

(Mr. Winegar)

I don't believe that is a fair

You never did?
Yes, I did.

(R-109)

(Emphasis added).

Adrnitedly, billing and payment on some of those billings
may be an indication concerning the agreement between the
parties.

However, Hr. Winegar's payment over objection

and this suit itself, with its counterclaim to recover
excessive fees, neuters any such inference.

Thus, the

record demonstrates that the Lower Court properly held that
there was no agreement between the parties to pay Mr. Sohm
a contingency fee.

This Court in its own memorandum de-

cision stated:
"It clearly appears to the Court from the
evidence that there never was a meeting of the
minds as to any agreement, contract, rate of pay,
or otherwise as to attorney's fees, and that the
plaintiff has been well compensated for the services
rendered by him to the defendant, ... " (R- 4 8) (Emphasis added) .
Appellant-Sohm has attempted to meet this finding by
asserting the new legal theory of estoppel.
of appellant's brief).

(See page 7

Appellant-Sohm's failure to cite

any legal authority for this assertion is indicative of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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its true legal merit.
Promissory estoppel is an equitable principle,
premised on detrimental reliance by one party because
of the actions or failure to act on the part of another.
Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 30.
The appellant-Sohm has no pleadings asserting estoppel
and has presented no fact to show detrimental reliance.
The principle of estoppel simply does not apply to this
case.

Rather, this case is more correctly one of oral

contract, with factual interests concerning offer,
acceptance and the reasonability of charges.

Certainly,

such a case does not raise the issue of estoppel.
Further, this Court has repeatedly held that it is
not proper to assert a new theory for the first time on
appeal.

In holding that matters not raised in the

pleadings nor put at issue in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, this Court
succinctly stated:
"Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is
the final settlement of controversies, requires
that a party must present his entire case and
his theory or theories of recovery to the trial
court; and having done so, he cannot change to
some different theory and thus attempt to keep
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation."
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d
301,470 P.2d 399; see also, Nickle v. Guarascio,
28 Utah 2d. 425, 503 P.2d 861 (1972).
However, it is to be noted that the writer has no
quarrel with the general points made in the citations of
authority submitted by appellant-Sohm, which in substance
state that a fee arrangement between a lawyer and a client
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~

one of contract.

The principles of contract do apply

to such an agreement; however, the cannons of ethics
regulating the conduct of lawyers throws significant
light on how the court should construe fee arrangements.
These cannons impose the following duties upon a lawyer:
As soon as feasible after a lawyer has been
employed, it is desirable that he reach a clear
agreement with his client as to the basis of the
fee charges to be made . . . . It is usually beneficial
to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties
regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent.
A lawyer should be mindful that many persons who
desire to employ him have had little or no experience
with fee charges of lawyers and, for this reason, he
should explain fully to such persons the reasons for
the particular fee arrangement he proposes.
Cannon
2-20 Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of
Judicial Conduct.
(Emphasis added) .
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long
been commonly accepted.

However, again the cannons of

ethics proscribes the lawyers conduct with regard to them.
They provide:
"Although a lawyer generally should decline
to accept employment on a contingency basis by one
who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is
not necessarily improper for a lawyer, where
justified by the particular circumstances of a case
to enter into a contingency fee contract in a civil
case with a client who, after being fully informed
of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement.
Cannon 2-20, Code of Professional Responsibility and
Code of Judicial Conduct.
(Emphasis added) .
In the case before the Bar, the appellant-Sohm failed
to meet these requirements.

In fact, the proof submitted

established that Mr. Winegar was able to pay a reasonable
fee, contracted with appellant-Sohm to pay a reasonable fee
based on an hourly charge of $25. per hour; further, he
paid to Mr. Sohm a series of billings, the first of which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clearly stated he was being charged on an hourly basis.
(See Statement of Facts number 2 through 7).
It is respectfully submitted that under the facts of
this case appellant-Sohm failed to prove the existence of
a contingent fee arrangement and the Lower Court findings
should be affirmed by this Court.
Similarly, with regard to the Rothe matter, fundamental principles of contract law are particularly relevant.
The Rothe matter was commenced and terminated in
approximately 1962, almost 13 years prior to the case before
the Bar.

Appellant-Sohm

testified that the Rothe case was

undertaken on a contingent fee basis; however, the respondentWinegar could not recall specifically the fee arrangement
which existed between him and Mr. Sohm in 1962.

However,

Mr. Winegar was certain that subsequent to the dismissal
of that action because of the Deadman's Statute, he had
received and paid a bill submitted by

~~.

Sohm.

On examination concerning this assertion, Mr. Sohm
admitted that subsequent to the case's dismissal, he had
billed for his services and had been paid.

He stated:

"I billed him something, I thought I ought
to have something for it."
(R-82-83).
Apparently, Mr.

l~inegar

agreed, either because of their

original understanding concerning fees or because he consented to a novation of their original understanding.

At

any rate, the matter was the subject of an accord and
satisfaction, quite apart from the fact (as alleged in
Mr. Winegar's answer and counterclaim) the Statute of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sohm on this case.

(See 78-12-36, Utah Code Ann., 1953;

R-12).
The testimony at trial was clear and unrebutted that
there was no specific agreement between the parties that
respondent-Winegar would pay a contingency of 25% for the
amount collected on the Rothe Estate check which was
tendered in 1975.

In fact, there was no mention or discussion

of any fee by Mr. Sohm; rather, it was reasonably assumed
by Mr. Winegar that he would pay a reasonable fee for the
time rendered by Mr. Sohm.

(See Statement of Facts 8

through 12).
Nowhere in the record does Mr. Sohm even suggest that
in 1975 he entered into any arrangement which remotely could
be considered as an agreement to assist Mr. Winegar on a
contingency basis, with reference to the Rothe Estate matter.
Rather, his entire claim is based upon the alleged contingent arrangement created some 13 years before, which by his
own admission he had converted into a fixed fee arrangement
and which fee had been fully satisfied in 1962.
It is respectfully submitted that the law of Utah requires
lawyers to establish clearly their fee arrangements with
their clients.

Particularly where contingent fee arrange-

ments are to be established, these arrangements should be
explained clearly to the client and where possible, reduced
to writing.

Because of a vastly superior position of

experience and knowledge, as recognized in the Cannons of
Ethics, the doubt concerning fee arrangements should be
resolved against the lawyer.
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In the case before the Bar the evidence overwhelmingly
shows that appellant-Sohm agreed to provide his services
on an hourly basis, but after collection became certain,
he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade respondent-Winegar
to accept a percentage contingent fee.

Having failed to

perform his burden of proof, the Court should affirm the
Lower Court's decision that there existed no contingent
fee arrangement.
POINT II
APPELLANT-SOHM HAS RECEIVED A REASONABLE FEE FOR HIS
SERVICES.
Appellant-Sohm did not plead in the alternative that
he should receive a reasonable fee for his service; however,
the defendant, in his counterclaim, did assert that he had
agreed to pay Mr. Sohm a reasonable attorney's fee.

In

this counterclaim, respondent-Winegar did allege that he
had paid an excess of a reasonable fee and requested a
judgment for the difference.
Concerning the reasonability of charges, the Cannons
of Professional Responsibility set the underlying framework
concerning the determination of a reasonable and proper fee.
These Cannons recognize that lawyers must be compensated
for their services in order to preserve the integrity and
independence of the profession.

However, it states:

"A lawyer should not charge more than a
reasonable fee, for excessive costs of legal
services would deter laymen from utilizing the
legal system in protection of their rights.
Furthermore, an excessive charge abuses the
professional relationship between lawyer and
client."
(E.C. 2-17, Code of Professional
SponsoredResponsibility).
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The Cannons further provide:
"The determination of the reasonableness
of a fee requires consideration of all relevant
circumstances, including those stated in the
disciplinary rules.
The fees of a lawyer will
vary according to many factors, including the
time required, his experience, ability, reputation,
the nature of the employment, the responsibility
involved, and the results obtained."
(E.C. 2-18,
Code of Professional Responsibility).
In the case before the Bar, appellant-Sohm cagily avoided
all questions concerning the amount of time extended on the
All Grain case, except the original 18 hour billing.

(R-78).

However, the Court record of the All Grain matter was
before the Court and examined by the Judge.

Further, Mr.

Winegar described the work that was actually performed in
that case in the following colloquy:
"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
It is in the record, or in the
Court that you have ten hours on it?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)
I haven't added it up.
I don't
know the amount, and I suspect it is greatly
over that.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
You prepared the complaint and
made two court appearances and then you had some
conversations with Mr. Winegar, said you weren't
doing anything to collect the money for him, is
that correct?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)
No.
I have had no conversations at
all.
I have collected the money and sent bills
on it and sent him records of it. "
(R-79)

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
After you obtained judgment what
efforts did you make at collection?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)
I contacted the attorney on numerous
instances, but mainly I kept the record of what
was received and submitted back to them the
interest, principle and the balance, and then
received payments apparently in February, March,
April and June.
They skipped a month."
(R-80).
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mony concerning the work performed came from cross-examination of Mr. Sohm. He testified that during 1975 he had
a couple of telephone conversations with representatives
of the Rothe Estate and conferences with Mr. Winegar.

He

testified:
"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)

vlho did you have to call?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm) I called Mr. Winegar a couple of times
and the attorney a couple of times, yes.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)

"A.

(Mr.Sohm) I phoned and used my own phone to talk
to him to find out what it was all about and the
necessary information.

"Q.

(Mr. Cutler)
Would it have been under a couple
or three hours?

"A.

(Mr. Sohm)

Was he in Heber City?

At least that."

(R-85).

Mr. Sohm then testified at that time he was billing at the
rate of $25. per hour to Mr. Winegar and stated:
"At that time I was billing $25. per hour
toMr. Winegar, ... "
(R-85).
With reference to the Flint-Walling dispute, Mr. Sohm
testified that he was entitled to two hours work at the rate
of $25. per hour; he stated:
" ... the last bill that amounted to two hours
was billed at $25. per hour."
(R-65; Exhibit 6-P).
Thus, giving Mr. Sohm the benefit of the doubt, there were
approximately 35 hours of legal work performed.

At the rate

of $25. per hour it would have generated a charge of $875.
However, on the contrary, the plaintiff was paid by his own
admission $2,000.00, butthe sum of $2,500.00 if Mr. Winegar's
testimony is believed.

(See Statement of Fact 7).
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Regarding the facts before the Lower Court, it
specifically found:
"1 . . . . regarding the matters of issue before
the Court, there never was a meeting of the minds
to an agreement concerning the payment of attorney's
fees.
Defendant did impliedly agree to pay a
reasonable fee for services rendered on the cases
subject of the within litigation.
"2. The plaintiff (Mr. Sohm) has been fully
paid a reasonable attorney's fee by the defendant
(Mr. Winegar) for all services rendered to the date
of the termination of their relationship and, in
particular, on all matters subject to the within
litigation."
(R-49).
The law in Utah, concerning appeals of contested
issues of fact, is so clear as to hardly require recitation:
Facts found by the lower Court will be viewed in a light
most favorable to the prevailing party.

Further, judgments

will be sustained on appeal if they are supported by any
substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.

The burden of overcoming the presumption of

the validity is upon the challenger.

Tazlor v. Johnson,

15 Utah 2d. 343, 393 P.2d. 382 (1964); Powers v. Taylor,
14 Utah 2d. 152, 379 P. 2d. 380 (1963); Gordon v. Provo,
15 Utah 2d. 287, 391 P.2d. 4 30

(1964) .

As the foregoing demonstrates, the appellant-Shorn
has chosen to quarrel with the findings sometimes on disputed issues of fact and on other occasions against his
own admissions of record.

Appe11ant-Sohm refused even

under cross-examination to state with specificity the work
which he had performed on behalf of Mr. Winegar or the
hours worked.

Rather, he attempted to proceed on the basis
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of a contingency fee arrangement, dispite his own
admissions to the contrary.
It is respectfully submitted that the Lower Court
attempted to give appellant-Sohm the benefit of the doubt
on the reasonability of the fee received by failing to award
a judgment to Mr. Winegar on his counterclaim for excessive
fees paid.

However, it is respectfully submitted that the

findings of the Lower Court concerning the reasonability of
the moneys received by Mr. Winegar should not be disturbed.
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should affirm
the decision of the Lower Court in all particulars and
dismiss the appeal, with costs awarded to respondent-Winegar.

CONCLUSION
To minimize unnecessary appeals, it is incumbent upon
appellants to view the facts in a light most favorable to
the prevailing party below.

The appellant-Sohm has failed

to so view the facts.
The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to the
prevailing party demonstrate that there was an explicit
agreement whereunder respondent-Winegar agreed to pay a
reasonable fee for sundry services rendered by attorney-Sohm.
Mr. Winegar paid approximately $2,500.00 in fees.

In

return he received legal services on two uncomplicated debt
collection matters.

A third case merely involved directing

the executor of an estate to the right address of the
defendant and acting as a middleman in presenting an offer
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of settlement on behalf of the estate.

A fourth merely

represented two hours of work, billed at $25. per hour.
The Lower Court finding that the moneys received were
more than a reasonable fee is adequately demonstrated
in the record and should be affirmed by the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

ROGER F. CUTLER,
Attorney for respondentWen D. Winegar
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